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Abstract: In order to improve the efficiency of government spending, it is 
necessary for the decentralized irrigation management to gain support from 
local institutions. Efficient institutions take on several distinct configurations in 
different irrigation districts. In this research, we upgrade Tang’s (1992) framework 
focusing on incentives, to a framework that includes institutional incentives and 
coordination. Within the framework, we then classify 5 institutional variables: 
water pricing reform (P), government funding (F), coordination by administration 
(C), having formal monitors (M) and self-organized management (S). This 
article processes the data obtained through a field survey (2009–2011) in 20 of 
China’s southern counties, where they implement the “Small-scale Irrigation and 
Water Conservancy Key Counties Construction (Key Counties Construction)”, 
a national project supported by the central government. Next, it applies Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure the efficiency of government spending 
and uses Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to extract efficient institutional 
configurations. It concludes that there are generally three types of institutional 
configurations able to improve the efficiency of government spending, which 
are respectively: “government funding combined with coordination by 
administration”, “water pricing reform combined with self-organized management 
and coordination by administration or water pricing reform combined with 
self-organized management and government funding and formal monitors” 
and “self-organized management”. Among these, the second configuration 
is a mixed governance structure with multiple institutions coexisting, and this 
configuration occurs in the most efficient key counties. For that reason, it is 
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viewed as the mainstream irrigation management approach, and we expect it to 
be the development trend in the future. Although Chinese irrigation policies are 
formalizing effective local institutions, they are still not sufficient. Future policies 
are needed to 1) promote institutions of government support for water laws in 
order to build stable expectations for both water user associations (WUAs) and 
farmers, 2) guide water pricing reform by ensuring farmers’ water rights and 
regulating water markets, and 3) provide opportunities for hiring professional 
monitors and crafting formal rules.
Keywords: Decentralized management, government spending efficiency, 
institutional configuration, mixed irrigation governance
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1. Introduction and literature review
This century has witnessed two major changes in China’s irrigation policy. The 
first change is that China’s government has been investing large amount of capital 
to construct small-scale irrigation systems with an average annual growth rate 
of more than 20%. These are typically gravity irrigation systems of surface 
water, generally including small-scale head works, storage facilities of dams and 
reservoirs, distribution canals and field canals, and drainage devices etc. Among 
these investment projects, the exemplar is the Small-scale Irrigation and Water 
Conservancy Key Counties Construction (referred as Key Counties Construction), 
in place since 2009. In 2009, the growth rate in small-scale irrigation rose to over 
48%, the highest in China’s history. The second change occurred in 2003 when 
China’s government instituted decentralized irrigation management throughout 
the country. This initiated the creation of water user associations (WUAs) and 
transferred management power to them from the government (or from the village 
organization). The Key Counties Construction project generates economic 
incentives for local government to establish WUAs, leading to more than 80,000 
associations springing up across China by 2013.
The Key Counties Construction is a massive agricultural project financed 
by the Chinese central government during the recent period of decentralization. 
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It was initiated by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Water Resource 
in 2009. Over 400 counties per year are selected to participate, with over 2450 
now enrolled around China. The construction period for each county is 3 years. 
Each county receives a similar amount, 8 million CNY1 per year from the central 
government and additional supporting subsidies of about 8 million CNY from 
the corresponding provincial government. Compared with other governmental-
funded agricultural projects, the Key Counties Construction has six unusual 
characteristics (Chai 2014).
1) A prerequisite for selecting a project area in a county is that farmer water 
user organizations (generally WUAs) must already exist there. This aims 
to incentivize counties to form well-organized systems of decentralized 
management, with WUAs assuming small-scale facility operation and 
maintenance (O&M) and connecting with water supply agencies.
2) The project makes county governments responsible for building irrigation 
facilities. In the past it had been undertaken by town governments 
and village organizations, both of which are only required to provide 
supportive services in the new system. This has dramatically reduced the 
administrative costs of local agencies.
3) Farmers also have to contribute part of the money and labor. The amount 
depends on the balance between the investment from governments and 
the cost of the project. This builds farmers’ ownership of the program and 
empowers them to support the project.
4) Additionally, farmers have veto rights on the execution of the project. 
They can say stop if the construction scheme and implementation is not 
consistent with their demands. Only after farmers accept the construction 
quality can the project enter to next phase. This transparent process builds 
farmers’ trust in the plans of investment and management.
5) Water resource agencies provide training on hydrology and irrigation 
O&M for WUAs. Most association members, including the leaders, often 
lack the scientific knowledge and specialized skills required in modern 
irrigation O&M, such as water flow supervision, information collection, 
culvert repair and canal maintenance. These trainings develop long-run 
capacity-building of WUAs for the future.
6) Agricultural water rate reform is included in the project. Its goals include 
transitioning water rates from being based on land area to water volume 
and standardizing water use plans. This is expected to provide farmers 
with exact information on water withdrawal, to keep it consistent with the 
water fees, and to endow WUAs with accurate records of water demand 
and to incentivize them to precisely distribute water.
1
 1CNY=0.163USD.
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Ostrom et al. (2007) state that there are no panaceas for the governance of human-
environment interactions. As a result, these changes may be expected to generate 
varying levels of performance of irrigation management in China. In exploring 
these variations, this paper has two objectives. The first is to evaluate the 
efficiency of government spending during the process of decentralized irrigation 
management. This is a difficult task because the simultaneous variation of 
multiple policies increases the complexity of quantification and also exacerbates 
the difficulty of research on irrigation governance. The second objective is to 
assess the roles of local institutions in government spending efficiency. This object 
embodies four questions: 1) how does the efficiency level of government spending 
vary due to decentralized management; 2) in which institutional configuration is 
the efficiency of government spending the highest; 3) are these local institutions 
for increasing the efficiency of government spending necessary or sufficient; 4) 
which institutions play the lead role in improving irrigation governance. These 
questions form the content of our study.
1.1. Simple decentralization and government spending efficiency
Decentralization has been advocated as an essential measure to improve the 
efficiency of government spending in irrigation (World Bank 1994; Vermillion 
and Sagardoy 1999). Many developing counties have tried this approach to solve 
the problem of inefficient government spending on public goods, which is mainly 
attributed to poor incentives caused by centralized management. From the 1970s 
to mid-1990s, through the assistance of foreign funds such as the World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank, 63 central governments among 75 developing and 
transiting countries began to transfer management power from the government 
to WUAs or the private sector. Decentralization is viewed as a panacea and often 
applied to many public projects, such as irrigation (Ostrom 2001). Other research 
also demonstrates that decentralization – sharing power between the government 
and community associations – is good for reducing transaction costs, allocating 
tasks, exchanging resources, resolving conflict and sharing risk (Pomeroy and 
Berkes 1997; Carlsson and Berkes 2005). However recent research demonstrates 
that decentralization produces mixed results in irrigation. The only widely 
experienced positive result is that government tends to reduce its administrative 
cost (World Bank 2011). A small number of short-term projects sponsored by 
World Bank also show improved efficiency of government spending. Still, 
most irrigation districts continue to suffer from poor performance with facility 
deterioration, water supply shortages and distribution inequity (Garcés-Restrepo 
et al. 2007; Wang et al. 2000, 2005).
Simple decentralization has been questioned and seen as a new barrier 
obstructing the efficiency of government spending. Decentralization has 
aggravated farmers’ economic burdens, reduced their interests and dampened 
their incentives to actively participate in irrigation management (IWMI 2003). 
Newly built WUAs, unfamiliar with professional techniques for modern facility, 
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lack the ability to perform standard O&M. In addition, they fail to undertake 
the projects previously designed by the government. As a result, the higher the 
technical standards contained in the facilities, the worse the O&M of the WUAs 
and a further lowering of benefits produced from the project (Khwaja 2009).
Decentralized irrigation management has been recognized as a process not a 
final destination. It cannot automatically motivate farmers to craft rules to manage 
irrigation with no consideration of extra factors influencing their incentives and 
behaviors (Zhou 2013). Policymakers are repeatedly recommended to quit using 
simplified developing blueprints and instead tailor lessons from early projects 
to local circumstances (Merry and Meinzen-Dick 2007). They still focus on the 
short-term effects of decentralization reform and investing in building large-scale 
facilities rather than learning from local institutions or nurturing these institutions 
because of the long time horizon required (Gulati et al. 2005).
1.2. Linking decentralization with local institutions
Many studies on irrigation decentralization begin to discuss the prerequisites for 
improving the efficiency of government spending. They concur that nurturing 
local institutions is critical and suggest a class of alternatives (Meinzen-Dick 
1997). They also clearly point out that local conditions are the main reason 
causing the failure of decentralization due to its inability to craft effective 
institutions or enforce them once established (Acheson 2006). To better explore 
these institutions, we upgrade Tang’s (1992) framework focusing on incentives, 
to include coordination and management. In our view, irrigation governance is a 
collective action challenge, whose essence lies in motivating management entities 
to coordinate users to maintain facilities and allocate water. Within our framework, 
we classify local institutions into two types: incentive institutions (including water 
pricing reform and government funding) and coordination institutions (including 
coordination by administration, establishing formal monitors and self-organized 
management).
Water pricing reform. Evidence for water pricing as an effective mechanism 
for decentralized management is complex. Many economists consistently propose 
that appropriate water pricing is crucial, in order to create incentives for WUAs to 
engage in daily management (Wang 2012), incur infrastructure expenses (Easter 
and Liu 2005), and sustain irrigation O&M (World Bank 2011). Some strongly 
suggest developing counties should reform water pricing, from a free commodity 
to a scarce, economically-priced good, at least covering full O&M cost (Liao et al. 
2005; Lohmar et al. 2007).
However, this view is criticized by other research (Perry 2001; Molle and Berkoff 
2007). They stress that, in areas of scarce water, farmers have rigid water demands, 
are not responsive to increased price, and may not constrain water use. Here, water 
pricing achieves conservation only on a theory level, rather than in practice (Corish 
et al. 2004; Molle 2009). Our study in Southern China is not a scarce water area. For 
this reason, we adopt the logic of water pricing leading to conservation. Our rational 
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is that water pricing reform inside WUA, at farm level, may benefit the WUA by both 
maintaining the water supply and regulating water demand.
Government funding. Irrigation systems have multiple externalities 
(Kobayashi 2005). They not only provide agricultural production and food security 
benefits, but also have social values such as supplying drinking water, beautifying 
the environment and protecting soil, and buffering water shortages suffered by the 
industrial sector in dry seasons. These roles create beneficiaries beyond farmers, 
so governments often assume responsibility to fund facility construction and 
maintenance. Furthermore, government funding can provide WUAs and farmers 
with stable input expectations and motivate them to contribute efforts as well 
(Yasuhiro 1998). In Japan water law fixes the investment level of government on 
small-scale irrigation at 70%.
Coordination by administration. Scholars agree that other than legal 
and political authority, the government should also provide administrative 
assistance for WUAs to ensure their sustainability (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997; 
Birner and Wittmer 2004). Similarly, studies in rural China show that successful 
decentralization reform requires WUAs to take on coordination responsibilities 
(He 2010; He and Guo 2010). However, WUAs are new entities and they generally 
lack the administrative capacity because China’s farmers still trust the central 
government and village committees more than the WUAs. As a result, WUAs 
have difficulty raising capital, mobilizing labor, and distributing water, let alone 
amassing the large-scale investment necessary to build public canals. To strengthen 
WUAs’ coordinative power, these studies suggest that government agencies are 
still needed to provide administrative support and coordinate irrigation plans.
Formal monitors. Research shows that formal monitors are necessary for 
effective irrigation governance through enforcing rules, discovering rule violators, 
and damping the temptation of water stealing in Spain, Japan and Nepal (Ostrom 
1990, 1992). Besides this, in China, monitors generally benefit WUAs by taking 
additional responsibilities, such as operating sluice gate, distributing water at the 
farm level, collecting water fees, and recording information (Huang et al. 2008). This 
institution has also been identified as a successful element in other Asian irrigation 
systems such as in India and Taiwan region (Meinzen-Dick 1984; Lam 1998).
Furthermore, formal monitors have incentives to carry out activities under 
appropriate conditions (Weissing and Ostrom 1991). The most important condition 
is to hire them as “integrated” monitors rather than “associated” ones. The former 
represent that monitors are part of the community managing the irrigation system, 
and their payoffs are directed related to the physical success of the local farmers; 
and the latter indicate that monitors are appointed by external authorities and their 
payoffs are determined by some measure of violations detected (Weissing and 
Ostrom 1993).
Self-organized management. Strong WUAs can affect the success of 
decentralization, through social norms encouraging and constraining user behavior 
(Lam 1998) and building upon farmers’ daily interactions and knowledge of each 
other for decision-making, monitoring, and sanctioning (Meinzen-Dick 1997). 
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Practice in Nepal demonstrates that self-organization may be more responsive 
to crisis as well as having a better understanding of local conditions than 
governmental bureaucracies (Lam 1998). Empirical study in China also shows 
that self-organization of farmers’ clans, rather than village leaders, leads to more 
contribution to irrigation expenditure and better governance (Xu and Yao 2015). 
Certainly, WUAs should be created on the basis of existing farmer organizations, 
which can often design more flexible mechanisms and diverse rules than top-
down government initiatives (Meinzen-Dick 2007). Self-organized management 
indicates that WUAs not only need to develop their own schemes of facility 
O&M, and craft and enforce rules of water distribution, but they also have the 
right to choose the governance structure (Lam and Ostrom 2010). Meinzen-Dick 
(1997) names it “Asian model”, one which is likely to develop in areas with high 
levels of social capital, cohesive societies, smaller land holdings, low market 
penetration and less infrastructure.
2. Data and methods
2.1. Samplings and data selection
During the process of decentralized management, in order to analyze the causal 
relationships between local institutions and the efficiency of government spending, 
we conducted detailed surveys in the irrigation districts. We chose southern rather 
than northern China, as a study area from two reasons. The first is that southern 
China typically has the surface irrigation facilities in place to expand and benefit 
from government investment. Northern China, by contrast, has surface canals 
as well as private groundwater wells whose investment comes from individual 
farmers. This mixed approach to irrigation makes publicly financed projects more 
difficult. The second reason is that, unlike the individual-level relationship among 
farmers in northern regions, southern China has a large number of self-organized 
farmer organizations already in place through clans, ethnic minorities and elderly 
associations. These provide deep-rooted cooperative relationships among farmers 
and provide social bases for them to establish and operate WUAs. The study area 
of 20 key counties is located in the provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan 
and Jiangxi, with 5 counties sampled in each province (see Figure 1). In order to 
ensure generalizability, we used a multistage sampling method. First, we collected 
input-output information from all the counties’ water resource departments of each 
province from 2009 to 2011. We then kept the county in the analysis if it had the 
required information. Lastly, we selected 1 year of data for each county based on its 
most active time period as reported by local media. This provided context-specific 
details for our follow-up field surveys. In addition, these 4 provinces all irrigate 
fields with water from reservoirs and dams run by local water resource bureaus.2
2
 Note that this indicates these project areas have similar biographic characteristics, community at-
tributes and governance environments. With these held constant, we can analyze the role of local 
institutions on government spending.
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Figure 1: Locations of the 20 project areas selected in 4 southern provinces, China 
(+: 2009; ++: 2010; +++:2011).
Data collection occurred in two stages. First, the sectional data was acquired 
from statistical reports issued by local water resource bureaus from each of the 
20 counties. For example, the county of Conghua in 2010 implemented the 
project in the town Aotou, but different towns in the other 2 years. As such, the 
data of 20 counties from different years, between 2009 and 2011, can be used to 
conduct a comparative analysis. The second stage of data was collected from case 
materials through our own fieldwork and from in-depth interviews with farmers, 
village leaders, WUA members and local officials. These qualitative data were 
aggregated at the level of a project area in one county. Generally, each project 
area in a county in 1 year only contains a couple of towns, about 10 neighboring 
villages.3 In other years, the project area in the same county involves different 
towns and villages. Therefore, a project area of one county in a specific year is our 
analysis unit. It is necessary to note that one county project may include multiple 
3
 In China, we have 5 administrative divisions: province – city/district – county--town – village. Each 
unit includes multiple smaller subunits. For instance, normally one town has about 5-40  villages. 
However, when it comes to Key County Construction projects per year, it only involves a part of the 
villages, part of the towns in one county.
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WUAs. Normally, there are <10 within one country project. Since the WUAs 
within a single project are located adjacently and have homogenous institutional 
features, we collected project-level data regarding local institutions, based on 
some representative WUAs.
2.2. Research methods
We use the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method (Seiford and Thrall 1990) 
to evaluate the efficiency of government spending. DEA is a nonparametric 
method, applying linear programming to measure the relative efficiency of 
multiple decision-making units when the production process presents a structure 
of multiple inputs and outputs. It is a tool used for benchmarking in management 
(public governance included), and the relatively efficient unit represents the best 
practitioner. In addition, it has the benefit of not needing to explicitly specify 
a mathematical form for the production function. This allows us to analyze the 
efficiency of government spending on irrigation across multiple objectives.
We set the input variable as total investment (CNY), which includes 8 million 
CNY subsidies from the central government, 8 million CNY in supporting subsidies 
from the provincial government, additional funds from lower-level governments 
as well as collective financing from the farmers. The output variables include 
newly added and rehabilitated irrigated area (ha), improved irrigated area (ha), 
added  food production capacity (kg), and amount of conserved water (m3). These 
calculations allow us to measure efficient government spending through effective 
irrigation governance and local institutional arrangements.
Since there is no singular local institutional arrangement that acts as a panacea 
for effective irrigation decentralization, it is necessary to analyze the multiple 
combinatorial effects of institutions on the outcomes. We then conducted a QCA 
method (Ragin 1987) to deconstruct which configurations of local institutions 
result in efficient government spending. Many of the debates in institutional 
interplay result from concerns with different methods analyzing different cases 
or aspects of cases. Either analyzing individual cases in depth or analyzing 
statistically numerous variables in one period create static views which compare 
individual institutions in pairs. They reveal fractional, rather than the whole, path 
effect of decentralization on the performance of government spending. QCA, 
by contrast, enables us to identify causal clusters of variables through patterns 
discerned across cases (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Here, we analyze how 
local institutions influence the efficiency of government spending, through the 
combination of conventional statistical analysis with QCA, based on the data 
collected from the Key Counties Construction project.
QCA applies Boolean logic as well as set theory to provide a more holistic 
view of socio-economic phenomenon, particularly for comparatively analyzing an 
intermediate number of cases. It treats one case as a configuration of causes and 
an outcome, considers this as an analysis unit, and dissects complex causes while 
comparing multiple cases (Ragin and Sonnett 2005; Rihoux 2008). QCA sheds new 
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light on our investigation of: 1) how different configurations of local institutions 
lead to different efficiency levels, 2) how different institutional configurations 
may generate similar outcomes, and 3) how combining institutional arrangements 
leads to discrete outcomes. QCA includes two versions: crisp-set and fuzzy-set. 
Fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) draws on fuzzy logic, and allows cases to have partial 
(or fuzzy) membership between 0 and 1, which will be adapted in our analysis.
3. Measurements
3.1. Measuring the efficiency of outcome
We use Deap2.0 software to evaluate the efficiency of government spending in 
these 20 key counties. Variable returns to scale (VRS), a measure of productive 
technical efficiency, was adopted to calculate performance levels. We divided 
VRS into four segments, which serve as the criterion of efficiency types. A 
county with VRS=1 is classified as efficient, 1<VRS≤0.67 as mostly efficient, 
0.67<VRS≤0.33 as less efficient, and VRS<0.33 as inefficient (see Table 1).
This project reports proportionally high levels of efficiency in southern China. 
6 counties attain the highest efficiency score (VRS=1), and another 6 as mostly 
efficient; while the remaining 8 counties scored as less efficient or inefficient, 
as shown in Figure 2. However, efficiency levels vary greatly across these 
areas, with the most successful province Jiangxi in aggregate (VRS=0.8842), 
followed by Hunan (VRS=0.7094) and Guangxi (VRS=0.5406) and Guangdong 
(VRS=0.4562).
Specifically, Jiangxi scored in the top two efficiency levels across its 5 counties. 
Hunan and Guangxi have similar distributions of efficiency, with both extremely 
highest and lowest scores coexisting. For instance, Mengshan, the lowest scoring 
county in Guangxi, with a VRS 0.118, is far less than the highest scoring county 
Pingle. Yongzhou, the lowest county in Hunan, with a VRS 0.230, lags far behind 
the other three highest counties of Liling, Jiahe and Mayang. This indicates that 
these two provinces have experienced quite unbalanced implementation and 
development of irrigation governance. Holding levels of investment, population 
and irrigation technology constant, differences in intra-provincial governance 
remain the only explanation for these gaps. Finally, in Guangdong, only the 
county Chaoan is high scoring (VRS=0.697), while the other 4 counties (Wuhua, 
Conghua, Luoding and Kaiping) are all low efficiency.
3.2. Measuring the institutional causes
Given similar decentralization mandates and similar levels of investment from 
governments, the difference played by local institution arrangements in these 
20 key counties is huge, resulting in varying levels of efficiency in irrigation 
governance. Efficiency levels increased throughout certain provinces such 
as Jiangxi. Meanwhile, only parts of Guangxi and Hunan achieved efficient 
outcomes. At the same time, Guangdong suffered from severe inefficiency, 
drastically wasting government resources.
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Figure 2: Comparison of the efficiency (white: efficient, light gray: mostly efficient, dark grey: 
less efficient, black: inefficient).
Table 2: Measurement and coding of conditions and outcome.a
Measurement  Coding
Conditions  Water pricing reform (P): Whether the project area of the 
county has reformed water pricing, normally increasing 
water rates to cover irrigation O&M costs.
 Present: P,1
Absent: p,0
 Government funding (F): Whether the project area of the 
county has obtained external support of government funding 
for irrigation extension and maintenance.
 Present: F,1
Absent: f,0
 Coordination by administration (C): Whether the local 
governments or village organizations of the project area 
in the county directly provide support WUAs’ affairs e.g. 
making decisions, crafting and enforcing rules. 
 Present: C,1
Absent: c,0
 Formal monitors (M): Whether the project area of the county 
has formal monitors responsible for monitoring infrastructure 
maintenance and water distribution.
 Present: M,1
Absent: m,0
 Self-organized management (S): Whether the project area 
of the county has authentic farmer water user organizations, 
e.g. WUAs, who, on their own, craft rules of operating and 
maintaining irrigation systems.
 Present: S,1
Absent: s,0 
Outcome  The efficiency distribution of (efficient, mostly efficient, less efficient, and 
inefficient) is calibrated by the four-value fuzzy set of (1, 0.67, 0.33, 0).
aAccording to the procedure suggested by Basurto and Speer (2012).
To investigate how institutional factors affect irrigation governance, one 
important question is whether we can identify causal pathways. In the light of 
our theoretical framework of incentives and coordination, coupled with in-depth 
interviews with local participants, we identify five institutional arrangements that can 
affect levels of efficiency: water pricing reform, government funding, coordination 
by administration, employing a formal monitor and self-organized management. 
These qualitative data are then coded into scores for the QCA (see Table 2).
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Water pricing reform (P). This institution means that water rates have been 
reformed to cover all or part of O&M costs. In practice, this reflects increasing 
water rates. Generally, volume of irrigation water can only be measured at the 
WUA or village level. At the farm level, water quantity is only assessed by land 
area irrigated due to lack of measuring devices. Hence, farmers are still charged 
an area-based rate. Many irrigation districts relied on national water policy and 
charged agricultural water 20 CNY/ mu,4 while others canceled water fees entirely 
and paid them via provincial finances. With subsidized water rates, farmers often 
wasted large amounts of water, and management struggled to cover routine costs 
of facility O&M. In order to rectify this situation, one of the priorities taken by 
some key counties has been to reform water pricing based around market forces. 
This aims to adjust the levels of water supply and demand simultaneously, to 
commercialize agricultural water use and to conserve water. Moreover, the 
additional revenue from commercialized water can create incentives for irrigation 
managers to invest more in operations and provide ongoing maintenance.
The idea that water pricing reform can result in efficient irrigation governance 
has proven quite successful, although not completely. Among the 20 key counties, 
7 of them have reformed water rate and gradually increase the price by up to 
50%, 6 of the 7 achieved scores of “efficient” or “mostly efficient” (see Figure 3). 
Interestingly, the remaining 13 counties do not reform water rate but 6 of them are 
efficient or mostly efficient as well. Thus, three issues are worth further examination: 
1) whether irrigation systems with water pricing reform are associated with higher 
performance than the system without this institution, 2) whether the incentive 
function from this institution is not enough to create efficient governance, and 3) 
whether this institution needs to be combined with other rules to improve efficiency.
Government funding (F). This variable refers to local governments 
providing funds for irrigation extension and maintenance, not for the operation 
of WUAs. Normally these funds are transferred through village organizations in 
the form of subsidized public projects. This institution exists in most irrigation 
4
 1 mu=1/15 ha.
Figure 3: Layout of local institutions and efficiency (E) (cells: 20 key counties; color instruction: 
same as Figure 2).
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districts (see Figure 2). 14 counties have invested in large-scale irrigation facility 
building and maintenance at least one time before spring cultivation. Our detailed 
investigation also reveals two thought-provoking phenomena. 1) The farmers 
insisted that ongoing government input in facility repair and maintenance was 
required to maintain water distribution. With this support, problems with water 
distribution can be automatically resolved without the need for any canal 
monitoring. The existence of government investment in facility maintenance 
reduces water seepage and leakage, increases the duration of access to water 
and mitigates the temptation to break the rules. 2) They also recognize that the 
fiscal funds should be delivered directly to the village organization rather than the 
WUAs because the village organizations have more experience with large-scale 
projects than the WUAs.
For example, in Pingle, even before the implement of Key Counties 
Construction project, its government had invested in facility repair every winter. 
The village committees were responsible for supplying additional materials, 
motivating farmers to participate. That process did not involve obvious efforts 
from the WUAs, although new associations were created every year. It shows 
that efficient governance is more likely when one county has government 
funding, even without the participation of WUAs. We did find evidence of one 
contradictory approach in Yongzhou. There, the irrigation investment from 
the local governments was managed only by the WUAs rather than the village 
organizations, which resulted in significant inefficiency.
Coordination by administration (C). This condition examines whether or not 
local governments or village organizations withdraw from irrigation governance. 
It stresses the degree of their direct intervention in WUAs’ affairs, e.g. making 
decisions, crafting and enforcing rules, etc. Figure 3 shows that this institution exists 
in 17 key counties. This makes it the most common institution under way in China, 
even while the amount of investment in irrigation is declining due to the decreasing 
revenue of the village organizations associated with the abolishment of agricultural 
tax. In theory, without this tax income, village organizations lack incentives to 
intervene irrigation affairs. Our survey reveals that it is the county governments that 
require the involvement of village organizations. Their participation was viewed 
as indispensable, not only in the whole process of decentralized management and 
irrigation governance, but also in the creation of WUAs.
However, on its own, the coordination by administration is not enough to 
generate effective irrigation governance, with only 4 out of the 17 counties achieving 
efficiency and another 6 mostly efficient. In particular, the craft of constructing 
facility has changed a lot, and modern systems have become more complex 
and technical. Wuhua and Luoding are the best cases to illustrate this problem. 
Their village committees have continued to organize farmers’ participation, but 
this has not made much difference. Although the newly modernized irrigation 
system motivates the farmers to participate, the labor inputs are not enough for the 
facilities. The new irrigation facilities feature new hardened canal walls, which 
require additional large-scale capital investment and professional techniques to 
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operate and maintain. As a result, the institution of coordination by administration 
is no longer sufficient for successful irrigation due to the need for additional 
capital inputs and professional management techniques.
Formal monitors (M). During the period of centralized irrigation management, 
monitors’ positions were generally taken on by village leaders as part time jobs. 
They did not have incentives to enforce the monitoring rules, since their stipend 
was unrelated to irrigation performance. That is to say, informal monitors are more 
likely to be a position on paper rather than in practice. With the decentralization 
reform, the local governments regard the institution of formal monitors as a core 
means for WUAs to solve the problem of water distribution. A typically operative 
rule for many key counties is “distributing water by one hoe”. This means that a 
monitor, using a hoe, controls all the water off-takes of the field canals. Besides 
this, the monitor’s responsibilities also include supervising water withdrawals, 
collecting water fees and punishing water stealers. Accountability of monitors 
may be held by either the WUA or the farmers through general meetings.
This institution is present in 8 key counties, and the payment for the monitors 
represents both an economic reward of salary as well as respect in the community. 
For example, the monitors of Mengshan, also leaders of farmers groups, are paid 
600 CNY each year by WUAs subsidized from the county government. The 
monitors of Pingle, ordinary farmers and WUA members, are paid 9 kg millets 
per mu irrigated area by the water users. Meanwhile, monitors in Yongfeng, also 
managers of the WUA, work for free.
What is more, this institution is occasionally associated with effective 
irrigation performance. Only 2 out of the 8 counties setting this position 
achieve efficient governance, and another 1 mostly efficient. The reason is that 
irrigation governance includes two parts of collective actions, coordinating 
infrastructure construction and water distribution. Both require resolution for 
effective governance. On these grounds, the monitoring institution generally 
requires additional institutions to resolve collective action dilemmas regarding 
infrastructure before water monitoring improves outcomes.
Self-organized management (S). In our study, self-organized management 
means that farmer water user organizations, on their own, craft rules to operate 
and maintain irrigation systems. We have counted situations in which rules 
were crafted with the efforts of WUAs including those contributed by farmer 
organizations such as clans and elderly associations. Additionally, we ruled out 
those WUAs, having autonomy and authority only on paper rather than in use.
Taking the clans as an example, they have authority to coordinate resources for 
facility O&M, and pay for these actions through farmer members sharing the total 
cost. Some clans, trusting the village committees, lobby and support them to form 
WUAs to take over the O&M responsibility, particularly in cases of canals that 
stretch across multiple villages. Only clans with a strong capacity to supervise the 
committees and have equal power to negotiate with them can guarantee that the 
WUA’s interests are consistent with the farmers’. By gaining support from both 
the clans and the village committees, the WUA nicely couples the incentive and 
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coordination functions. This process appropriately reflects the essence of efficient 
governance and accords with the purpose set by our analysis framework.
This institution is present in 9 key counties, 7 of them achieve efficient or 
mostly efficient. It is significantly associated with driving up the performance 
of government spending. Some efficient counties had self-governance in their 
WUAs even before the Key Counties Construction project, such as Mayang, 
Pingle and Jiahe. We take Mayang as an example to address the function and 
efficacy of self-organized management. In 2008, 12 WUAs were created across 
38 villages, with 7015 households’ participation and about 100,000 mu irrigated 
areas covered. These WUAs raised a total of 1.69 million CNY, a substantial 
increase when compared with the previous year. They also conserved 40% more 
water, reducing by 50% the time of water withdrawal while reducing water fees 
from 28 to 16 CNY/mu on average. Since the implementation of the Key Counties 
Construction project in 2009, the WUAs have substantially enhanced capacity 
related to irrigation O&M, and have grown into major management entities, 
capable of producing larger-scale benefits.
Other efficient counties, establishing of autonomous WUAs, completely 
stemmed from the project. For example, Liling actively laid a solid foundation for 
the creation of WUAs on the clans, after learning of the successful experiences 
in Mayang and Jiahe. In 2010, the project brought Liling a total investment of 16 
million CNY, including 8 million CNY subsidies from the central government and 
the rest from local governments and farmers. This input generated huge efficiency 
gains with 1635 ha of newly added and rehabilitated irrigated areas, 5280 ha of 
improved irrigated areas, 127 million additional kg of food production capacity 
and 7.72 million m3 of conserved water.
Principally, all the 20 key counties should have farmer-run water user 
organizations. Instead, 11 have nominal self-organized management, and these 
are gradually withering away. By 2011, Guangdong had established 1200 WUAs 
but many of these were soon disbanded. The most serious situation occurred in the 
county Kaiping, where 6 WUAs were revoked because they lacked incentives to 
engage in irrigation maintenance and struggled to sustainably operate so as to fail 
the annual inspection within 3 years.5
4. Results
4.1. Coding: causes and outcome
We use letters to mark presence or absence of condition for causes and outcome: 
upper case letter representing presence and lower case absence (see Table 2). 
The five local institutions, the causes, are coded respectively: 1) water pricing 
reform present P or absent p, 2) government funding present F or absent f, 3) 
5
 Recently, the WUA has been formalized, which requires registration at the civil affair bureau. Only 
WUAs passing the annual inspection can continue to operate. If they do not pass the inspection, they 
are cancelled.
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coordination by administration present C or absent c, 4) formal monitors present 
M or absent m, and 5) self-organized management present S or absent s. The 
efficiency of government spending is coded in the form of four-value fuzzy set, 
with (efficient, mostly efficient, less efficient, inefficient) meaning (present, more 
present than out, more out than present, absent) and correspondingly the first two 
being treated as present and symbolized as E.
4.2. Truth table and Boolean analysis
We use Boolean logic to clarify how configuration of local institutions may lead 
to efficient governance and to differentiate necessary and sufficient conditions. 
The first step is to understand how these 5 institutional causes were represented in 
the key counties. Generally they are found in combinations that vary in how they 
affect the efficiency of government spending. In Table 3, the existing condition is 
valued “Present” and the non-existing is valued “Absent”. Some causal conditions 
are easy to code and value such as F\M\P, while other conditions like C and S are 
difficult to directly value “Present or Absent”, which require careful judgment 
based on local history and case studies. We derive detailed descriptions and 
reviews about each case through interviews with locals in each county in order 
to value C and S inductively. First, two coders coded the 20 cases separately. 
Then, they discussed any disagreement directly and let a third coder decide the 
appropriate coding, in an effort to increase inter-coder reliability.
Boolean logic is then used to build a truth table and list all the configurations 
generated by the 5 local institutions. The truth table shows that these 20 cases 
generate 14 different configurations. As the last column of Table 3 shows, some 
configurations contain multiple counties, others include only one.
4.3. Simplifying and explaining the institutional configurations
We use fs/QCA software6
 to extract the institutional configurations leading to 
efficiency (E) in government spending. The truth table solution generates four 
simplified causal pathways (“FmC”, “PFMS”, “PmCS” and “pfmcS”) to the 
given outcome E, as shown in Equation (1). The symbol of “+” represents the 
logic relationship “OR” and the “×” represents “AND”. Two parameters of fit in 
QCA are consistency and coverage. Consistency measures the degree to which 
institutional configurations are always associated with an outcome and values 
>0.75 indicates high consistency. Coverage evaluates the percentage of cases 
with the outcome they explain and a score closer to 1 is better. In our study, the 
overall solution consistency value is 0.820 and solution coverage score 0.845, 
which demonstrate the 4 pathways a good fit to the cases.7
 
= + + +E FmC PFMS PmCS pfmcS
 (1)
6
 Software by Ragin is freely available at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/.
7
 As for the inefficient configurations, they are individual cases and not enough to represent the 
 common features of failure. Therefore, this paper can not show their local conditions.
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Considering our critical research contents, we identify and investigate three groups 
of questions from these results. They aim to examine the roles and relationships 
of the multiple participants (government, market and WUAs) and the institutions 
used in decentralized irrigation management. First, how important is C or F in 
generating efficient outcomes? Can C or F be removed from the local institutions 
entirely? What are the supporting conditions for C or F in order to increase irrigation 
performance? Second, how important is the institution P or M in improving the 
efficiency of government spending, and is either of them a sufficient condition? If 
it is not, what kind of institutional environment can support P or M in increasing 
efficiency? Third, since one of the main objects of the Key Counties Construction 
project is to promote WUAs to find ways to manage irrigation, is S a sufficient 
condition? In order to elaborate on these questions, we adjusted Equation (1) into 
a factored Equation (2) based on logic following standard QCA methodology.
 
= + + + ( )
Government Mixed Selfgovernance governance governance
E FmC PS mC FM pfmcS
 (2)
Equation (2) is comprised of 3 pathways of institutional combinations. Any 
pathway is sufficient to generate effective irrigation governance and efficient 
government spending.8 The following will analyze the statements of these 
pathways in detail.
8
 Fieldwork shows that self-organized management (S) embodies two kinds of capacity. The WUA 
with strong capacity can completely govern irrigation system on its own. In this situation, S is suf-
ficient for efficient outcome, which is the third pathway of configuration. While the weak WUA, with 
no powerful authority, is not able to manage irrigation independently. Apparently in this situation, S 
requires support from other institutions, which is the second configuration.
Table 3: Truth table of causes and outcome.
5 causal conditions  Number of 
key counties
P  F  M  C  S
Absent  Present Absent  Present Absent  3
Absent  Present Present Present Absent  3
Absent  Absent  Absent  Present Absent  2
Present Absent  Absent  Present Present 2
Absent  Absent  Absent  Absent  Present 1
Absent  Absent  Present Present Absent  1
Present Present Present Present Present 1
Absent  Present Absent  Present Present 1
Absent  Present Present Present Present 1
Present Present Absent  Present Absent  1
Present Present Absent  Present Present 1
Present Present Present Absent  Present 1
Present Present Present Present Absent  1
Present Present Present Present Present 1
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We entitled the first pathway “FmC” as “government governance”, with 
traditional centralization making sense. The existence of both coordination 
by administration and government funding (FC) is a sufficient condition for 
efficient outcomes (E), and the use of a formal monitor may be absent (m). This 
configuration could contribute to illustrating two phenomena. First, in practice, 
this institutional condition FC has been prevalent in the efficient key counties 
with weak autonomy of WUAs, such as Chaoan, Liling and Luzhai. It also 
turns out that in the governance environment of theses remote areas, only local 
governments and village organizations having enough authority and capacity 
to engage in irrigation management. Second, comparing FmC with PSmC (the 
second pathway), F seems to have an equal effect with PS, which means F can be 
substituted by PS. That is if the government does not provide funding for irrigation 
O&M due to fiscal problems, the governance responsibility may be transferred to 
the WUAs themselves along with the reform of water pricing. This substitutable 
relationship may explain the initial intention of transferring management power 
from governments to WUAs or market forces, as has occurred in the developing 
and transition countries since 1970s (World Bank 1994).
The second pathway “PS (mC+FM)” indicates a “mixed governance” structure 
including markets, water user organizations, formal monitors and government 
entities. The presence of PS is necessary, not sufficient, for E, and either the 
presence of C or the combination of FM is indispensable for PS to work. This 
configuration connotes three significant points. First, the interactive relationship 
between P and S asserts that the debate about whether water pricing reform or 
self-organization is more important than the other (World Bank 2011) is not 
appropriate. Indeed, these two institutions depend on each other, and the presence 
of both can generate efficient when combined with other situations. Second, the 
combination of PSFM is like the “Americas model” describing governance in 
the Columbia Basin, Mexico and Chile (Meinzen-Dick 1997), which features the 
formalization of irrigation organizations, specification of professional roles and 
emphasizing farmers’ water rights. We can expect that the combination of PSmC 
may shift to PSFM in future, and the function of C could be substituted by FM. 
Third, comparatively, this configuration requires multiple conditions and is the 
most complex among the three institutional configurations that lead to efficiency. 
However, this mixed governance structure also dominates in the efficient key 
counties, with Duchang, Anfu, Mayang and Gaoan occupying 1/3 of the total. We 
view this as potentially a transition governance structure from government-led to 
a system of self-governance.
We have titled the third pathway, “pfmcS”, as “self governance” with only 
farmer water user organizations, generally a WUA, in the leading role. In this 
configuration, self-organized management (S) is the sufficient condition, and other 
institutions may be absent (pfmc). Obviously, a WUA could completely substitute 
either market or administrative intervention to work independently. However, 
this efficiency is a low probability event, and is only present in one key county, 
Jiahe. Our fieldwork further demonstrates that Jiahe takes on an equal level of 
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power between the WUAs and the local governments. Aggregating more than 20 
ethnic minorities, their leaders are also WUA chairmen and relatives of the local 
officials. As a result, these three parties overlap and share common social norms. 
This pathway to efficiency is not likely to emerge in other counties and would 
be difficult to duplicate around China, due to its distinct social organization and 
unique institutional environments. Recent research also provides evidence that 
these local conditions did exist in China before 2005, when the traditional villages 
were still poor and isolated, featured strong social institutions and were not greatly 
affected by globalization and market access (Xu and Yao 2015). Likewise, this 
configuration, as a typical “Asian model”, is familiar in other developing counties 
such as Nepal, India, Philippines and Sri Lanka (Meinzen-Dick 1997).
5. Conclusions and suggestions
Our study assesses the efficiency of government spending and explores how local 
institutions affect this efficiency during the process of decentralized irrigation 
management. We emphasize three main conclusions. These conclusions provide 
insights for policymakers on which local institutions to emphasize, differentiates 
among the responsibilities of the government, market and farmer water user 
organizations, and supports WUAs in crafting rules of irrigation O&M.
(1) The diverse contexts for applying local institutions have resulted in 
decentralization producing rather different efficiencies in government spending. 
Cases of inferior performance reflect that some provinces lack the necessary 
conditions that decentralization requires. With a trend of continuing decentralization, 
the central government, not knowing about local institutions, anticipates exchanging 
irrigation investment for deepening decentralization and the promotion of WUAs 
through the Key Counties Construction project. Importantly, it has directed large-
scale capital spending to build and rehabilitate irrigation systems, with unbalanced 
results. In some cases, inappropriate institutional arrangements are counteracting 
the performance of decentralization and investment.
On the other side, the Key Counties Construction project has indeed played 
a leading role in strengthening some local institutions. First, the capacity of 
coordination by administration from village organizations has improved and village 
leaders have strengthened their own roles. Second, the reform of water pricing has 
been introduced into some counties and has enhanced farmers’ awareness of the 
full price of water. Third, WUAs have the opportunity to develop and acquire the 
right to supervise government projects, as well as create a platform to craft rules 
for irrigation O&M. This has increased the interactions among farmers and helped 
them to learn their own importance in irrigation governance.
(2) In our sample area of southern China, 12 counties (60%) scored as efficient 
or mostly efficient, with each taking one of three institutional pathways to 
efficiency. In some counties, such as Chaoan, Liling and Luzhai, the configuration 
of “government funding combined with coordination by administration (FC)” 
is a sufficient condition. In others “water pricing reform combined with 
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self-organized management institutions (PS)” are necessary, along with additional 
institutions to work efficiently. Both Duchang and Anfu also require coordination 
by administration (C), while Mayang and Gaoan require both government funding 
and a formal monitor (FM). As mentioned previously, in the third pathway used in 
Jiahe, self-organized management (S) is sufficient.
(3) Current irrigation policies are formalizing effective local institutions, but 
they are still not sufficient. As Meinzen-Dick (1997) addresses that the “Americas” 
model, featured with specialized and formal irrigation organizations, is one 
direction in which the “Asian” model could transit. However, current Chinese 
policies of Key Counties Construction and decentralization, both stress the 
investment institution of government funding (F) and the government structure of 
coordination by administration (C) and self-organized management (S). Although 
these policies encourage reforming water pricing (P) to regulate water demands, 
formal documents of new water prices have not worked out at local level across the 
country. So far, they have not touched on the other institution of formal monitors 
(M), let alone formalize it. Furthermore, the investment policy and government 
funding institutions are not water law and may only work in the short term.
Therefore, future policies are needed to promote the institution of government 
funding into water law and build stable expectations for both WUAs and farmers, 
guide water pricing reform by ensuring farmers’ water rights and regulating 
water markets, and to provide opportunities for hiring professional monitors and 
crafting formal rules.
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